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Analysis of Colombian Trade Agreements from 2007 to 2013*
RYAN LEE
University of La Verne
ABSTRACT
I analyze the firm-level effects on Colombia entering into Preferential
Trade Agreements (PTAs) between 2007 and 2013. The combination of
detailed firm-level data and PTAs make this article unique. In particular, I
look at two separate potential trade-promotion effects of the agreements.
The first result deals with how exporting firms in Colombia respond to the
tariff cuts in the agreements. The tariff cuts from the agreements increase
the size of exports by Colombian firms (the intensive margin); however,
tariff cuts do not increase the number of exporting Colombian firms (the
extensive margin). The second result deals with how the signed PTAs
affect how Colombia sets tariffs on the set of the world. I find that the
agreements do not affect Colombia’s other tariffs, a result that further
complicates the open question of whether trade agreements lead to lower
overall tariffs (building-block effect) or higher overall tariffs (stumblingblock effect).
KEY WORDS Trade Margins; Trade Liberalization; Trade Agreements
I investigate the effects of trade liberalization by Colombia from 2007 to 2013. During
this time, Colombia entered into six preferential trade agreements (PTAs). These
agreements were all signed during the struggling, and now broken-down, Doha Round of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Specifically, I look at the margins of trade in
relation to tariffs and preference margins. Along with investigating trade margins, I look
at the relationship between preferential tariff cuts and multilateral tariff cuts.
I also investigate the building-block or stumbling-block effects of PTAs that
entered into force for Colombia. A stumbling-block effect would imply that Colombia’s
entry into PTAs decreases the country’s future trade liberalization. Unlike previous
papers that have analyzed trade at the HS6 level, or even more aggregate product levels, I
employ a firm-level data set of imports into Colombia and exports from Colombia.
The first benefit of the firm-level data is that both the intensive and extensive
margins can be analyzed. Previous work has been limited to view the changes in total
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ryan Lee, University of
La Verne, College of Business and Public Management, 1950 Third Street, La Verne, CA 91750;
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trade volume. I comment on the changes in trade volume, the number of firms in the
market, and the distribution of firms. Specifically, regarding exporting firms, their
presence in every market is tracked: entry, number of shipments, and trade volume for
imports into and exports out of Colombia.
The second benefit of firm-level data is that the detailed nature of the data allows
for analysis at the tariff line. Previous work has relied on more aggregated HS6 codes.
Tariff lines are often set at the HS8 or HS10 level, however; therefore, earlier work has
had to rely on averages of the tariffs at the HS6 level, rather than on the true tariff. When
analyzing the building-block or stumbling-block effect of PTAs, I am thus able to look at
detailed tariff lines. The effect for non-Colombia signees will be analyzed at the HS6
level, but specificity is available for Colombia.
A third benefit is the specificity of the trade agreements. Some tariff reductions
are phased in. I am able to analyze the subsequent years along with the initial tariff cut. It
is known that the benefits of trade agreements are not instantly seen; I will speak to the
prolonged benefit of trade agreements. Similarly, the dates that trade agreements were
signed, but not enforced, are known. The dates of signing can allow for changes in
behavior in anticipation of the agreement being enacted. Likewise, multiple trade
agreements went into force during the years for which data is available.
LITERATURE REVIEW
As I investigate various aspects of preferential agreements, trade margins, and stumblingblock or building-block effects, there are two tangentially related literatures, which I
discuss below.
Trade Margins
Chaney (2008) lays the theoretical framework for breaking down trade into firm-level
extensive and intensive margins within a gravity model. Early test evidence on the
margins focused on distance. Hillberry and Hummels (2008) analyze trade within the
United States. They find that the extensive margin is the primary driver of trade margins.
The number of shipments is highly sensitive to the distance; however, the average value
of a shipment is roughly constant for local destinations before gradually decreasing.
Crozet and Koenig (2010) similarly investigate the role of distance on trade and follows a
similar methodology to Hillberry and Hummels (2008). With a similar methodology, the
same basic result is found of distance affecting the extensive margin more. Ottaviano and
Mayer (2007) also look at the role of distance on trade margins, but they look at the
margins from an aggregated country level.
My work is most similar to that of Buono and Lalanne (2012) and Debaere and
Mostashari (2010). Buono and Lalanne (2012) investigate the intensive and extensive
margin using French data. The product data uses three-digit summary economic
classification product classifications, whereas I am able to use HS codes, which at the
six-digit level correspond perfectly to applied tariff data provided by the WTO. Similarly,
the three-digit NES code allows for country-sector analysis, not analysis at the product
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level. Buono and Lalanne (2012) find that the intensive margin is much more affected by
tariff cuts, while the extensive margin is smaller in magnitude and significance. The tariff
cuts investigated were all part of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. By the built-in
most-favored-nation (MFN) structure of the WTO, there is no ability to analyze
preferential rates granted to French exporters. Lastly, the Uruguay Round is generally
considered a success. The same cannot be said of the recent and currently suspended
Doha Round.
Debaere and Mostashari (2010) analyze exports to the United States from 1989–
2006 and are able to make use of disaggregated HS6 product codes. Thus, unlike for
Buono and Lalanne (2012), their analysis is at the product level, not the sector level.
Debaere and Mostashari analyzes only the extensive margin, which is found to be much
less important for low-income countries; however, although the export data is
disaggregated at the product level, there is no data for the number of firms. In a love-ofvariety framework, there are gains of trade to be made by having a second firm export
the same product. Debaere and Mostashari do find that the extensive margin is of little
importance, although using U.S. tariff data does not include a variable for the
preference margin.
Foster, Poeschl, and Stehrer (2011) include a dummy if a PTA was signed
between two countries. That paper finds weak evidence that extensive margin is more
important for PTAs, but it does not use actual tariff levels, only the presence of a PTA
entering into force. Likewise, Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) look at the product
extensive margin, but they break agreements down based on how “deep” the agreements
are. Baier et al. find that the deeper the agreement (or the more integrated the two
countries become), the larger the effect on both trade margins. Another novel approach in
the paper was to analyze the lagged time effects of tariff changes on the margins. Both
Foster et al. and Baier et al. follow the decomposition formulated in Hummels and
Klenow (2005).
Stumbling Block or Building Block
The basic premise of trade diversion is that when countries sign a PTA or enter a customs
union, the “new” trade between the member nations is not newly created trade but rather,
trade has moved from nonmember countries to member countries. The trade diversion
between nonmembers and members needs to be less than the new trade between member
countries for a regional trade agreement (RTA) to be trade-creating. Because of this trade
diversion, trade agreements can actually serve as stumbling blocks to further trade
liberalization. Theoretical work by Limao (2007) has found that if preferential
agreements serve in part to extract non-trade concessions and environmental, labor, and
intellectual property standards, agreements can serve as stumbling blocks. Horn,
Mavroidis, and Sapir (2010) suggest that these “WTO extra” agreements, agreements
with the above-mentioned standards, and their implications offer an area of study.
A popularly analyzed trade agreement was the creation of Mercosur, a Latin
American trade bloc and customs union. Bohara, Gawande, and Sanguinetti (2004)
analyze Argentinian data to test the Richardson hypothesis that trade diversion can lead
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to declines in external tariffs. Bohara et al. pinpoint industries that experienced trade
diversion, finding that these industries experienced a decline in tariffs. Thus, although
relative prices change, the decline in tariffs could help offset the changes in terms-oftrade; however, issues include that the data begin after Mercosur went into effect and do
not adjust for Mercosur becoming a customs union. Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas
(2008) also look at Mercosur, along with other Latin American countries. They find that
RTAs are often building blocks to further agreements.
Expanding with Estevadeordal et al. (2008), Tovar (2012) conducts a similar
study finding evidence of RTAs serving as a stumbling block; however, Tovar looks at
small Central American countries that entered into Dominican Republic–Centra America
Free Trade Agreement, and finds a small stumbling-block effect. Tovar deals with a
shorter time frame—2005–2009, compared to 1990–2001. Limao (2006) finds that PTAs
serve as stumbling blocks for the United States. Similarly, Limao (2007) finds that trade
agreements can serve as stumbling blocks for multilateralism. Trade agreements are not
found to be stumbling blocks to EU ascension, however. Karacaovali and Limao (2008)
look at the European Union and United States, thus offering a look at large developed
countries instead of the small developing countries found in Tovar (2012). It is worth
noting that Karacaovali and Limao find that often, the United States and European Union
offer unilateral concessions for gains in nontariff areas.
Some papers have attempted to analyze the effects of trade agreements on trade
creation and trade diversion. Magee (2008) finds evidence of trade diversion but that the
benefits of trade creation outweigh the costs of diversion. Magee also provides evidence
of the anticipatory effects of trade creation. In a short study, Dai, Yotov, and Zylkin
(2014) use a gravity model to find that trade agreements have trade-diversion effects.
Endoh (1999) runs a gravity model, but the estimation is not the PPML used in current
gravity estimation, so it is not certain the results are unbiased.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Data on trade flows, imports, and exports were collected from Colombia governmental
agencies. The data contain the Colombian firm, the value of trade in both FOB (Free On
Board; the value of exports and imports of goods as they leave the exporting country,
which does not include shipping, insurance, and other charges) and CIF (Cost, Insurance,
and Freight; the value of exports and imports, including the cost of shipping and
insurance) at the HS10 level, and information on the partner firm. Additional information
on firms is from DANE and SIREM, two Colombian data sources. The data cover 2007
to 2013.
During the years of data availability, Colombia entered into six PTAs, with
Canada, Chile, the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras), the
EFTA (Lichtenstein, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland), the European Union, and the
United States. Because of data availability from the WTO on specific preferential
tariffs, only the agreements with Canada, Chile, the Northern Triangle, and the
European Union are analyzed for Colombian imports. For exports, data are also
available for the United States.
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Figure 1 illustrates the size of the preference margin given to Colombia by various
PTA partners in 2013. As seen, many tariff lines do not have preference margins. The lack
of preference margin is often a result of the MFN tariff being set at zero. Also seen in
Figure 1 is a glimpse of nations setting MFN tariffs. For both Honduras and Ecuador, the
density of preference margins spikes at “round” numbers: 5, 10, 15, and 20 for Ecuador, for
example (and likewise other members of the Andean Community, or CAN).
Figure 1. Colombian Preference Margins in 2013

As seen in Table 1, the PTA tariff is often much lower. On average, the
preference margin is greater than 3.5. There is also anecdotal evidence of the buildingblocks theory of trade agreements.
As seen in Table 2, most of the tariff cuts are in the first year, as the average PTA
drops, at most, a little over one percentage point. Similarly, it seems that most cuts to
zero occur in the first year of the agreement; however, there is large variation in percent
of lines that are not cut. The smaller countries see little movement in more tariffs being
cut. Meanwhile, for the larger countries (the European Union and Canada), the decrease
in the average PTA tariff for later years is also being driven by cuts in tariffs that were
originally unchanged.
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Table 1. Summary Stats: Tariff Cuts on Colombian Imports,
First Year of Agreement
Country

Date
Signed

Date
Enforced

Chile

27 Nov
2006
9 Aug
2007
9 Aug
2007
9 Aug
2007
21 Nov
2008
26 Jun
2012

8 May
2009
12 Nov
2009
1 Feb
2009
21 Mar
2010
15 Aug
2011
1 Mar
2013

Guatemala
El
Salvador
Honduras
Canada
European
Union

Avg
MFN
Tariff
12.16

Avg
PTA
Tariff
0.35

11.84

% to
Zero
97.48

%
Not
Cut
0

Total
Tariff
Lines
7264

5.59

63.96

20.70

7055

11.85

5.62

64.20

21.56

7073

11.80

3.23

77.76

7.96

7075

8.50

3.75

65.97

30.92

7267

7.84

3.88

59.89

34.38

6853

Note: Avg=average; MFN=most favored nation; PTA=preferential trade agreements.

Table 2. Summary Statistics: Tariff Cuts on Colombian Imports in Years
Following Agreement

Chile
Guatemala
El Salvador
Honduras
Canada
European Union

Second Year
Avg
% to
%
PTA
Zero
Not
Tariff
Cut
0.23
97.48
0
5.28
63.96 20.70
5.27
64.20 21.56
2.89
77.76
7.96
3.54
65.97 22.52
3.68
59.89 31.05

Third Year
Avg
% to
%
PTA
Zero
Not
Tariff
Cut
0.12
97.48
0
4.96
63.96 20.70
4.93
64.28 21.56
2.55
77.84
7.96
3.06
65.97 10.62
3.31
59.89 19.99

Note: Avg=average; MFN=most favored nation; PTA=preferential trade agreements.
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RESULTS
This section details the econometric specifications and their results. The first subsection
investigates the effect of PTAs on the margins of trade. The second subsection
investigates whether the recent string of PTAs has aided or harmed multilateral trade
reduction, building-block or stumbling-block effect.
Trade Margins
I break the log of trade volume, xjkt, down by xjkt = njkt + vjkt, where njkt is the log number
of firms exporting and vjkt is the average volume of exports by firm. The subscripts
denote partner (j), product (k), and year (t). This breakdown of trade margins results in
the extensive margin being defined as the number of firms exporting a product to a
destination. This definition of the extensive margin differs from that of Buono and
Lalanne (2012), in which the extensive margin is the number of firms in a sector
exporting to a destination. When the extensive margin is defined at the product level, the
gains from trade due to more varieties can be analyzed. Now as more firms export a
product, the number of varieties available to consumers increases.
Defining the margin of interest as Mjkt and exploiting the fact that tariffs vary
across destination, product, and year, the regression of interest is specified as
Mjkt = α0 + α1Tariffjkt + α2Prefjkt + δjt1 + δst2 + εjkt

(1)

Tarff is defined as ln(1 + tjkt), where tjkt is the ad velorem tariff rate; Pref captures
the importance of the preference margin, the difference between the MFN tariff at the
preferential tariff; δjt1 and δst2 represent destination-year and HS2-sector-year dummies;
and εjkt is the error term.
As seen in Table 3, the traditional gravity controls are of expected sign and
magnitude. Distance is negative and of similar size to the results in Buono and Lalanne
(2012). With Colombia, colonial ties are strictly with Spain, so the colonial-ties variable
is not included. The inclusion of country-year dummies greatly lowers the coefficients on
both the tariff and preference margin, as seen in Table 4.
Without including the preference margin, the coefficients on the tariff take similar
values and significance to those in Buono and Lalanne (2012). Once the preference
margin is included, however, the importance of the tariff is cut in half and there are large
drops in significance. As with the tariff, the preference margin plays a larger role than the
intensive margin. The main takeaway from Table 4 is that trade agreements increase trade
volume by granting lower preferential tariffs. This importance is demonstrated by the fact
that Pref is large and statistically significant in the last three columns of Table 4 while
Tariff is often insignificant, as well as magnitudes smaller. Additionally, trade
agreements do not increase the number of firms that export (extensive margin); rather, the
increase in trade is due to more volume (intensive margin). The results on the extensive
margin are similar to those shown in Buono and Lalanne (2012); however, I analyze
preferential tariff cuts rather than WTO tariff cuts.
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Table 3. OLS Trade Margins, Gravity Controls
Variables
Tariff
Pref
GDP
Distance
Landlocked
Common
Language
Obs
R-squared

Without variable Pref
Total
Intensive
Extensive
–4.013*** –3.394*** –0.619***
(0.556)
(0.447)
(0.145)
0.375***
(0.0179)
–1.122***
(0.0528)
–0.0418
(0.0923)
0.447***
(0.0745)
165,162
0.308

0.245***
(0.0152)
–0.697***
(0.0452)
–0.0142
(0.0803)
0.178***
(0.0641)
165,162
0.317

0.130***
(0.0050)
–0.425***
(0.0158)
–0.0276
(0.0264)
0.269***
(0.0202)
165,162
0.356

With variable Pref
Total
Intensive
Extensive
–1.656**
–1.049*** –0.606***
(0.465)
(0.358)
(0.145)
4.551***
4.357***
0.195
(0.383)
(0.313)
(0.142)
0.358***
0.225***
0.133***
(0.0176)
(0.0144)
(0.0050)
–1.015*** –0.579*** –0.436***
(0.0498)
(0.0403)
(0.0161)
–0.316*** –0.284***
–0.0321
(0.103)
(0.0918)
(0.0284)
0.407***
0.147**
0.259***
(0.0729)
(0.0619)
(0.0204)
159,624
159,624
159,624
0.319
0.330
0.359

Notes: GDP=gross domestic product; Obs=number of observations; OLS=ordinary least squares;
Pref=preference margin.
Standard errors are two-tailed and clustered at the HS6 product level.
Year fixed effects are used in each.
* p < .1

** p < .05

*** p < .001

Table 4. OLS Margins, Equation 1
Variables
Tariff
Pref
Observations
R-squared

Without variable Pref
Total
Intensive
Extensive
–1.698*** –1.568***
–0.130
(0.438)
(0.352)
(0.120)
166,116
0.341

166,116
0.348

166,116
0.391

With variable Pref
Total
Intensive
Extensive
–0.810*
–0.769**
–0.0410
(0.430)
(0.345)
(0.119)
2.875***
2.548***
0.327*
(0.460)
(0.360)
(0.172)
160,609
160,609
160,609
0.348
0.356
0.394

Notes: OLS=ordinary least squares; Pref=preference margin.
Standard errors are two-tailed and clustered at the HS2 sector level.
Country-year and sector-year fixed effects are used in each.
* p < .1

** p < .05
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Stumbling Block or Building Block
The first investigation is of the building-block or stumbling-block effect of preferential
trade agreements. To test, I ran a regression similar to that of Estevadeordal et al. (2008)
and Tovar (2012):
ΔMFNt = β0 + β1L.ΔMinPreft + β2L.MRGt + β3L.st + β4L.(MRG*s)t + δst2+ εt

(2)

The L. in front of all variable names indicates that the value from the previous
year, or lagged value, is used. L.ΔMinPreft is the change in the minimum preference
margin. (As a reminder, the preference margin is defined as the MFN tariff minus the
preferential tariff.) L.MRG is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the preference
margin is greater than 2.5. The variable L.s represents the share of imports from all
partners with preferential agreements. L.(MRG*s) is an interaction term. HS2-sector-year
dummies (δst2) are included. Unlike the previous section, which looked at how changes in
the tariffs faced by Colombian exporters affected their export decisions, this section of
the paper relies on import tariffs set by Colombia.
Although Tables 1 and 2 indicate that there might be some building-block effect
as MFN rates are also falling, it is important to note that in 2013, more than 65 percent of
imports were from PTA members. Combine the percent of imports from PTA members
with the fact that 17 percent of all imports originated in China; a large portion of trade is
under preferential agreements or with China.
The results in Table 5 show neither a stumbling-block nor a building-block effect.
The lack of subsequent multilateral tariff reductions could be a result of the Doha Round
failing to materialize in large tariff cuts. With the failure of the Doha Round, there have
been worries that the WTO is becoming outdated and that multilateral trade reductions
could be difficult going forward, although there is little evidence from Colombia that the
new PTAs have hurt tariff concessions to nonmembers. The coefficient on the
preference-margin dummy is weakly significant, however. The negative sign on L.MRG
could indicate that Colombia also reduced MFN tariffs on products for which the country
offered larger tariff concessions on in PTAs.
As Estevadeordal et al. (2008) found, any stumbling block effect is driven by the
formation of customs unions (CUs). Colombia did not enter into any CUs during the
years analyzed, but it is a part of the Andean Community (CAN), which contains
Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador. Columns two and four categorize trade from
agreement members based on whether the member is in a PTA (sPTA) or CU (sCU) with
Colombia. This extra classification does not affect the results. Also in line with
Estevadeordal et al. and Tovar, I used the preferential tariff cuts of Colombia's cosigner
to instrument Colombia's preferential cuts. The IV approach does not alter the results. As
can be seen in Table 5, the IV regressions cannot be performed at the HS10 level, as after
the HS6 level, product classifications need not be the same across countries; therefore,
there are fewer product lines. Even with the IV specification and the separation of CU
members and PTA members, there still does not appear to be evidence that Colombia’s
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trade liberalization between 2007 and 2013 was either a stumbling block or a building
block to future tariff reductions.
Table 5. Building Block or Stumbling Block, Equation 2

L.ΔMinPref
L.MRG
L.s
L.(MRG*s)
L.sCU

(1)
OLS
0.00102
(0.0270)
–2.203**
(0.913)
6.020
(4.978)
–0.188
(0.122)

L.(MRG*sCU)
L.sPTA
L.(MRG*sPTA)
Observations
R-squared

13,564
0.571

(2)
OLS
–0.00136
(0.0238)
–1.065**
(0.519)

2.704
(2.910)
–2.883
(2.944)
6.020
(4.978)
–6.180
(5.003)
13,564
0.576

(3)
OLS-IV
–0.0114
(0.00764)
–1.658**
(0.658)
1.064
(1.196)
0.0494
(0.107)

6,196
0.719

(4)
OLS-IV
–0.0119
(0.00764)
–1.411*
(0.755)

0.990
(1.964)
–0.918
(1.978)
1.064
(1.196)
–1.021
(1.227)
6,196
0.719

Notes: OLS=ordinary least squares; OLS-IV=ordinary least squares-instrumenal variable.
Columns 1 and 3 treat all trade agreements as the same; columns 2 and 4 break up s based on the type
of trade agreement.
Standard erross are two-tailed and clustered at the HS2 sector level.
Sector-year fixed effects are used in each.
* p < .1

** p < .05

*** p < .001

CONCLUSION
Using a unique firm-level data set for Colombian trade flows, I was able to analyze two
separate implications of Colombia entering into PTAs between 2007 and 2013.
The first main results are that PTAs increase the amount that Colombian firms
export, an increase in the intensive margin of trade; however, the PTAs do not increase
the number of Colombian firms that export, the extensive margin of trade. Thus, I find
that essentially all of the increase in trade after an agreement is due to existing exporters
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increasing the sizes of their shipments. Previous papers were not able to provide this level
of firm and product detail.
The second main result is that more-recent Latin American PTAs do not seem to
act as either stumbling blocks or building blocks to future trade liberalization. Whereas
previous papers looked at older trade agreements, to find stumbling blocks or building
blocks, I analyzed recent trade agreements that took place during the failed Doha Round
of WTO negotiations. My finding that the agreements functioned as neither a stumbling
block nor a building block further complicates the open question regarding the role of
trade agreements promoting future trade liberalization.
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